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and Christopher M. Anderson
The rural public may not only be concerned with the consequences of land management; residents may
also have systematic preferences for policy instruments applied to management goals. Preferences for
outcomes do not necessarily imply matching support for the underlying policy process. This study
assesses relationships among support for elements of the policy process and preferences for manage-
ment outcomes. Preferences are examined within the context of alternative proposals to manage growth
and conserve landscape attributes in southern New England. Results are based on (a) stated prefer-
ences estimated from a multi-attribute contingent choice survey of rural residents, and (b) Likert-scale
assessment of strength of support for land use policy tools. Findings indicate general but not universal
correlation among policy support indicators and preferences for associated land use outcomes, but also
confirm the suspicion that policy support and land use preference may not always coincide.
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stated preference
The rural public may not only be concerned with
the consequences of land management, they may
also have systematic preferences for policy proce-
dures applied to management goals (Abdalla, 2001;
Johnston, Swallow, and Weaver, 1999; Northeast
Regional Center for Rural Development, 2002;
McLeod, Woirhaye, and Menkhaus, 1999). There
is no guarantee respondents will support policies
that are consistent with their stated preferences
for land use outcomes. Indeed, respondents may
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possess strong preferences for management out-
comes (e.g., wildlife habitat, public access) while
being unwilling to accept the management pro-
cesses required to generate those outcomes
(Johnston, 2002). Despite this possibility, the liter-
ature provides little information indicating whether
preferences for management outcomes are corre-
lated with support for policies associated with those
outcomes.
Consider the example of a scenic, rural view-
shed. Residents may have strong preferences for the
preservation of scenic amenities, and indeed may be
willing to pay to preserve these attributes. How-
ever, they may be unwilling to accept changes in
zoning or alternative land use regulations required
to ensure these outcomes (e.g., required setbacks,
increases in required road frontage). Despite a
positive willingness to pay (WTP) for the manage-
ment outcome, a lack of support for associated
management tools may preclude welfare-improving
policy change.
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This study examines relationships among the
rural public’s support for the policy process and the
public’s preferences and goals for land manage-
ment and conservation outcomes. Preferences are
considered within the context of alternative pro-
posals to manage residential growth and conserve
landscape attributes in southern New England.
Results are based on (a) stated preferences
estimated from a multi-attribute choice survey of
rural residents,
1 and (b) a Likert-scale assessment of
strength of support for 21 growth management and
conservation tools. Data are drawn from the Rhode
Island Rural Land Use Survey—a survey developed
and designed by the authors to assess rural residents’
tradeoffs among attributes of residential develop-
ment and conservation.
Description of the Model and Analysis
The choice experiment section of the Rhode Island
Rural Land Use Survey asked respondents to
consider and choose between two alternative
development options for a hypothetical, 400-acre
tract of forested land located in their town of
residence, an area comprising just over 1% of the
land area in each of the four towns sampled. Each
presented option could differ across a set of spatial
and nonspatial attributes. Analysis of these results
provides insight into preferences for development
and conservation tradeoffs—or management out-
comes.
A subsequent section of the survey asked
respondents to indicate their degree of support for,
or opposition to, 21 different land use management
policy options. Strength of support was indicated on
a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = “strongly
oppose” to 5 = “strongly support”—providing in-
sight into respondents’ support for different manage-
ment mechanisms.
Findings are drawn from a qualitative compar-
ison of (a) Likert-scale policy support ratings, and
(b) results of the choice model of conservation and
development (outcome) preferences. These initial
findings are further explored through a model
integrating principal-components factor analysis of
Likert-scale responses with the discrete choice
model of land use preferences.
A Discrete Choice Model of Land 
Use Preference
To model a respondent’s choice between develop-
ment plans, we define a simple utility function that
includes arguments for attributes of a rural residen-
tial development or conservation plan and the net
cost of the plan to the respondent (Hanemann,
1984; McConnell, 1990):
(1)  U(@) ' U(Xc, Y&Fc) ' v(Xc, Y&Fc) % gc,
where Xc is a vector of variables describing attri-
butes of development or conservation plan c, Y is
disposable income of the respondent, Fc denotes
change in mandatory taxes and fees paid by the
respondent under development plan c, v(·) is a
function representing the empirically measurable
component of utility, and gc is a term representing
econometric error.
The respondent compares the current develop-
ment plan (c = A) to the alternate development plan
(c = B), such that the change in utility (dU) is given
by:
(2)  dU' U(XA,Y&FA)&U(XB,Y&FB)
' [v(XA,Y&FA)&v(XB,Y&FB)]&[gB&gA]
' dv&θ,
where FA is the unavoidable household cost of plan
A, and FB is the cost of plan B. In this case, the pay-
ment vehicle for these costs is mandatory annual
town taxes and fees paid by the household.
2
The theoretical model assumes a respondent
assesses the difference between utility under the two
plans and indicates the sign of dU by choosing either
the current (dU>0) or alternate (dU<0) develop-
ment plan. If θ is assumed to have a logistic distribu-
tion, then the familiar logit model applies, in which
the probability of selecting a given option is a logis-
tic function of the utility difference dv (Maddala,
1983). This is the common random utility model
often applied to contingent choice or conjoint survey
data (Hanemann, 1984; McConnell, 1990).
The Survey
The Rhode Island Rural Land Use Survey was
designed to assess rural residents’ tradeoffs among
attributes of residential development and conserva-
1  This approach to stated preference analysis has been variously called
contingent choice (e.g., Opaluch et al., 1993), conjoint analysis (e.g., Roe,
Boyle, and Teisl, 1996), or choice experiments (e.g., Adamowicz et al.,
1998).
2  Johnston, Swallow, and Weaver (1999) provide additional discussion
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tion. Development of the survey required over 18
months, including background research, interviews
with policy makers and residents, and focus groups.
Following Johnston et al. (1995), intensive focus
group sessions and pretests were conducted to en-
sure the survey language and format could be easily
understood by respondents, and that respondents
shared similar and consistent interpretations of sur-
vey questions and instructions.
Contingent Choice Scenarios and the 
Econometric Model
Focus groups and expert interviews determined the
selection of land use attributes for consideration in
contingent choice scenarios, and led to a survey
format in which information was presented on
stylized maps of hypothetical development and
conservation plans. Attributes distinguishing plans
characterized protected open space, residential
development, unprotected undeveloped land, scenic
views, wildlife habitat, public access, recreational
facilities, traffic, and taxes. Table 1 summarizes
attributes distinguishing the development and con-
servation scenarios.
Prior to presenting respondents with development
choices, the survey provided background com-
munity information and reminded respondents of
tradeoffs implicit in development choices. Choice
instructions and questions were then presented, in
which respondents were given the choice of voting
for the “current” development plan (CDP) or the
“alternate” development plan (ADP), relative to the
same 400-acre undeveloped site.
Each respondent considered three potential pairs
of current and alternate plans. Respondents were
instructed to consider each pair independent of pre-
vious choices, and to assume that all choices applied
to the same 400-acre parcel. The survey character-
ized the parcel as undeveloped and forested prior to
the choice of development plans; respondents were
also told the approximate location of the parcel in
their community. The “current” and “alternate” plans
were presented as development or conservation
options which would alter the existing state of this
hypothetical undeveloped and unpreserved site.
3
Labels for the two plans were chosen based on
focus groups, with the goal of grounding respond-
ents in the policy context surrounding actual local
development proposals (Blamey et al., 2000).
Respondents were also told, “If you do not vote for
either plan, development will automatically occur
as shown by the current development plan”—
thereby specifying the status quo that would occur
if no choice were made (Adamowicz et al., 1998).
This framework was chosen to mimic actual com-
munity considerations of development proposals,
wherein a landowner possesses the property rights
necessary to permit development. However, officials
may seek to influence the configuration of the devel-
opment, delaying permits unless design changes are
made. As a result, while some form of development
or conservation is virtually certain, officials may
exert some control over its ultimate form.
Fractional factorial design was used to construct
a range of survey questions with an orthogonal array
of attribute levels. All attributes were free to vary
over their full range for both the current and alter-
nate plans, with no imposed ordering of attribute
levels between the two plans. This procedure
resulted in 128 unique contingent choice questions
divided among 43 different survey booklets (three
questions per booklet). The chosen survey design
had the added advantage of reducing the potential
for “yea-saying” (Blamey, Bennett, and Morrison,
1999; Boyle et al., 1998), as most development plans
incorporated both positive and negative elements.
Hence, in most choice questions, neither the current
nor alternate development plan offered a clearly
superior choice for a respondent wishing to express
environmental motivations (cf. Blamey, Bennett, and
Morrison, 1999).
Because the choice data are comprised of three
responses per survey, there is a possibility of corre-
lated errors across responses (Alberini, Kanninen,
and Carson, 1997; Poe, Welsh, and Champ, 1997).
This correlation may be modeled using a variety of
methods, including generalized estimating equation
(GEE) models (Liang and Zeger, 1986; Johnston,
Swallow, and Bauer, 2002), random-coefficients
models (Train, 1998), and random-effects models
(Pendergast et al., 1996).
In this case, we model potential error correlation
by splitting θ in equation (2) into two components: ˜ θ
that is i.i.d. across all respondents and for each
individual respondent, and γh representing system-
atic variation related to unobserved characteristics
of respondent h. If the γh are assumed normally
distributed across respondents, and we retain the
prior assumption regarding the logistic distribution
of the model may be estimated as a random- ˜ θ,
effects logit model (Alberini, Kanninen, and Carson,
3  Specifically, it was made clear that the “current” development plan
did not represent the existing condition of the hypothetical parcel, but
rather represented one of the two development plans being considered.68   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1.  Model Variables: Definitions and Summary Statistics for Current Development Plan
(CDP) and Alternate Development Plan (ADP)
Variable Name Description Units and Measurement
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Adj$Open The difference between acres of open space
adjacent to developments and roads in the CDP
and ADP
Acres in CDP minus acres in ADP
[Range: !200 to +200]
!3.10630  
(95.680)
Iso$Open The difference between acres of open space not
adjacent to developments and roads in the CDP
and ADP
Acres in CDP minus acres in ADP
[Range: !200 to +200]
2.61979
(53.457)
Size$Dif The difference between acres of residential
development in the CDP and ADP
Acres in CDP minus acres in ADP
[Range: !200 to +200]
!1.54948  
(90.751)
Dense$Dif The difference in housing density in the CDP
and ADP
Houses/acre in CDP minus houses/acre
in ADP [Range: !2 to +2]
!0.00007  
(0.9824)
Lg$Mammal Difference between habitat quality for large
mammals in CDP and that in ADP
Difference in wildlife habitat quality
scale [1 = worst; 5 = best]
!0.00606  
(1.2306)
Sm$Mammal Difference between habitat quality for small
mammals in CDP and that in ADP
Difference in wildlife habitat quality
scale [1 = worst; 5 = best]
!0.01909  
(1.2401)
Com$Bird Difference between habitat quality for common
birds in CDP and that in ADP
Difference in wildlife habitat quality
scale [1 = worst; 5 = best]
0.03947
(1.7437)
Uncom$Bird Difference between habitat quality for
uncommon birds in CDP and that in ADP
Difference in wildlife habitat quality
scale [1 = worst; 5 = best]
!0.00643  
(1.7361)
Wet$Sp Difference between habitat quality for wetland
species in CDP and that in ADP
Difference in wildlife habitat quality
scale [1 = worst; 5 = best]
!0.02625  
(1.7347)
Traf$Light Difference between dummy variables indicating
the presence of a traffic light on the main road,
in the CDP and ADP
Difference between dummy variables
for CDP and ADP
!0.00257  
(0.7044)
Tax$Dif Difference in additional annual taxes and fees
between CDP and ADP (resulting from
management plan)
Dollars in CDP minus dollars in ADP
[Range: !$325 to +$325]
!0.98678  
(155.37)
Low$Vis Difference between dummy variables indicating
the presence of development either highly
screened or not visible from the main road, in
the CDP and ADP. Survey versions included
eight separate photographs characterizing
different development visibility levels; four of
these photographs are characterized as low
visibility development.
Difference between dummy variables
for CDP and ADP
!0.00900  
(0.7003)
Edge$Area The difference between the edge-area ratio of
residential development shown in the CDP and
the edge-area ratio of residential development
shown in the ADP. All ratios are calculated as
the sum of the perimeter(s) divided by the sum
of the area(s) of land highlighted for residential
development in a development plan.
Calculated at a scale of 1 unit = 933.37
feet (e.g., a 1 unit × 1 unit sq. block is
equivalent to 20 acres or ~871,180 sq.
feet, with an edge-area ratio of 4)
[Range: !14.85 to +8.5]
0.04524
(3.7013)
Develop2 Difference between dummy variables indicating
the presence of a two-section, fragmented
development in the CDP and ADP. In all cases,
development sections are rectangular.
Difference between dummy variables
for CDP and ADP
0.01505
(0.4252)
Develop4 Difference between dummy variables indicating
the presence of a four- or five-section,
fragmented development in the CDP and ADP.
In all cases, development sections are
rectangular.
Difference between dummy variables
for CDP and ADP
!0.00587  
(0.6042)
Develop$Road Difference between dummy variables indicating
the presence of developments located adjacent
to main roads, in the CDP and ADP
Difference between dummy variables
for CDP and ADP
0.00056
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1997; Hsiao, 1986). Because the model is binary,
the IIA property and associated concerns do not
apply.
Likert-Scale Policy Support Questions
Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of
opposition or support for 21 different land use man-
agement policy options, on a five-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = “strongly oppose” to 5 = “strongly
support.” Descriptions of policy options were refined
though focus groups and pretests, and selected with
the assistance of local land use officials. Among
others, these policy options included zoning changes,
fee-based land preservation techniques, tax policies,
housing caps, and various types of impact fees
(table 2).
Based on the results of focus groups, all policies
were described in simple, nontechnical terms.
Although we attempted to assess general policy
support independent of the particular set of land use
attributes targeted, there are some implicit and
unavoidable links between certain policy tools and
particular types of land use attributes. For example,
well-head zoning (described in the survey as “zoning
to protect water quality”) is necessarily linked to
water quality attributes.
All respondents considered the same set of 21
policy options. Table 2 lists the policy options rated
by respondents, and the mean support ratings
associated with each option in each of the four rural
Rhode Island communities sampled: Burrillville,
Coventry, Exeter, and West Greenwich. Mean scores
above 3.0 indicate that the average respondent
supports the policy option, with higher scores
denoting greater mean support. Mean scores below
3.0 reveal the average respondent opposes the pol-
icy option, with lower scores showing greater mean
opposition.
Despite differences in the extent and type of
development and the ongoing policy process in the
rural communities sampled, respondents from the
four communities reveal a high degree of consist-
ency in policy support across the 21 management
tools.
4 As expected, respondents indicated general
support for conservation policy options, and general
opposition to policy options encouraging develop-
ment (table 2). However, the specific characteristics
of policy tools are relevant. For example, tools
which encourage conservation through explicit tax
increases (e.g., policy options 5 and 9) are generally
opposed by residents, compared to other conser-
vation options which, in general, receive strong
support. Results also illustrate that opposition to
policies encouraging residential development (e.g.,
policy options 2 and 12) exceeds opposition to
otherwise analogous policies encouraging commer-
cial development (e.g., options 1 and 13).
Contingent Choice Results: Base Model
Surveys were mailed to 4,000 randomly selected
residents of four Rhode Island rural communities
(Burrillville, Coventry, Exeter, and West Green-
wich) following the total survey design method
(Dillman, 2000). Of the 3,702 deliverable surveys,
2,157 were returned, for a response rate of 58.2%.
Response rates ranged from 50.4% (Coventry) to
58.7% (West Greenwich).
To allow for heterogeneity in preferences and
policy support across different communities, indi-
vidual choice models are presented for Burrillville
and Exeter. Results are suppressed for Coventry
and West Greenwich for the sake of brevity, and to
allow sufficient discussion of Burrillville and Exeter
results. Results from the two suppressed models
offer little fundamental intuition beyond that
provided by the Burrillville and Exeter models. The
Burrillville model incorporates data from 528 sur-
veys received from this community; these include
1,351 responses to choice questions. The Exeter
model incorporates 1,338 responses from 538
surveys. Surveys returned by those few individuals
who failed to respond in any way to choice ques-
tions were omitted from the analysis.
Model results are presented in table 3. Burrill-
ville results are based on a random-effects logit
model. An analogous random-effects model for
Exeter would not converge given traditional
maximum-likelihood methods; hence standard logit
results are presented for this community. 
Both models are statistically significant at
p<0.0001 (for Burrillville, !2LnL χ
2=441.52, df=
16; for Exeter, !2LnL χ
2=470.12, df=16). Of 16
model attributes, 11 are significant in the Burrill-
ville model, while 13 are statistically significant at
p<0.05 in the Exeter model. Signs of significant
parameter estimates correspond with prior expec-
tations derived from focus groups, where a priori
expectations exist (cf. Johnston, Swallow, and
Bauer, 2002).
4  A notable exception is policy option 6, which reflects support for the
revitalization of village centers using public funds. Support for this option
is higher in communities with more distinct village centers (Burrillville
and Coventry), and lower in communities with less obvious or populous
village centers (Exeter and West Greenwich).70   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 2.  Likert-Scale Strength-of-Support Ratings for Land Use Policy Options: Mean Ratings of
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19 Require new commercial development to occur within
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Notes: Mean ratings are based on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly oppose and 5 = strongly support. Numbers in parentheses are
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Table 3.  Choice Model Base Results: Burrillville and Exeter
Burrillville Model
 a Exeter Model (std. logit)
 b
Variable   Parameter Estimate z-Statistic    Parameter Estimate z-Statistic
Intercept !0.051686 !0.74 0.172756*** !2.56
Edge$Area 0.140387*** 5.08 0.122696*** 4.42
Develop2 !0.187741 !1.00 !0.543437*** !2.87
Develop4 !0.478766*** !3.38 !0.381821*** !2.78
Iso$Open 0.006478*** 4.62 0.006776*** 4.64
Adj$Open 0.003523*** 4.67 0.004272*** 5.71
Develop$Road !0.220212** !2.01 !0.308200*** !2.77
Lg$Mammal 0.149862*** 2.63 0.121017** 2.24
Sm$Mammal !0.061103 !1.09 !0.065327 !1.21
Com$Bird 0.119919*** 3.07 0.129623*** 3.27
Uncom$Bird !0.020583 !0.52 0.010469 0.28
Wet$Sp 0.004121 0.10 0.074446* 1.85
Dense$Dif !0.928414*** !10.32 !0.850958*** !10.40
Size$Dif !0.006295*** !6.41 !0.007224*** !7.35
Traf$Light 0.208801** 2.11 0.088353 0.91
Low$Vis 0.118877 1.22 0.240758*** 2.56
Tax$Dif !0.004833*** !9.74 !0.004946*** !10.69
ln(σv) !1.80 1.07   — —
σv 0.41 0.22   — —
ρ 0.14 0.13   — —
!2LnL χ
2:           441.52 (Prob = 0.01)             470.12 (Prob = 0.01)
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively.
a Burrillville results are based on a random-effects logit model.
b The random-effects model for Exeter did not converge appropriately using standard maximum-likelihood methods. Hence the presented
results are based on a standard fixed-effects logit model.
Initial comparison of contingent choice results
(table 3) with Likert-scale policy ratings (table 2)
points to numerous areas in which preferences for
land use outcomes coincide with support for associ-
ated policy mechanisms. Findings here are largely
qualitative, and indicate that at a general, aggregate
level, respondents appear to support policies (in the
Likert-scale analysis) that generate outcomes for
which marginal utility is positive (in the contingent
choice analysis).
For example, aversions to residential development
found in the choice model coincide with support for
development-constraining policy tools. Choice
model results reveal negative marginal utility
associated with the size and density of residential
developments (table 3, Size$Dif and Dense$Dif ).
Similarly, Likert-scale results show strong support
for policies which explicitly limit or cap develop-
ment (e.g., table 2, option 20). In contrast, policy
options that would contribute to an increase in
development (table 2, options 1, 2, 4, 12, and 13)
received low Likert-scale preference scores—in all
cases less than 2.75 on a five-point scale. Policy
options which would contribute to an increase in
residential development (table 2, options 2 and 12)
are the lowest rated of all options.
Negative marginal utility associated with the
placement of new residential developments along-
side main roads (table 3, Develop$Road) coincides
with support for a requirement that trees and shrubs
be placed between new houses and roads (table 2,
option 15). Similarly, respondents’ support for
policies which preserve undeveloped land (table 2,
options 3, 7, 8, 9, and 14) coincides with positive
marginal utility of preserved open space (table 3,
Iso$Open and Adj$Open). However, the specific
mechanism is relevant. Policies preserving undevel-
oped land using public bonds (table 2, option 8) and
real estate transfer taxes (option 9) ranked lower
than other conservation mechanisms, including
preservation by land trusts (option 7) and through
reductions in taxes on undeveloped lands (option 3).72   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
The real estate transfer tax (option 9) was the only
open space conservation option to receive a support
rating less than 3.0 (i.e., the threshold between
policy support and opposition).
Despite general agreement between aggregate
policy support and choice model results, a particu-
larly high degree of Likert-scale support does not
guarantee that associated outcomes will be welfare-
enhancing. For example, we find strong support for
a policy option requiring housing developers to con-
serve open space as part of residential developments
(table 2, option 14). However, choice model results
reveal a relatively lower preference for open space
located adjacent to residential development, com-
pared to otherwise identical open space isolated from
developments (table 3, Adj$Open versus Iso$Open).
Based on these findings, the most highly rated
mechanism for open space conservation provides a
type of open space less valued by existing residents.
A Combined Preference Model
The above results reflect aggregate, qualitative com-
parisons of independent choice models and Likert-
scale analyses. These findings may be further
quantified through a model combining principal-
components factor analysis of Likert-scale responses
with the random-effects logit model. Such analysis
may be used to assess statistical correlation among
preferences for land use outcomes and support for
policy tools. In recognition of the fact that factor
analysis results will likely differ across communi-
ties, distinct factor models are estimated for the
communities of Burrillville and Exeter.
Following Variyam, Jorday, and Epperson (1990),
factor analyses are conducted to estimate a small
number of underlying constructs which together
account for a large percentage of observed variation
in Likert-scale responses of policy support. These
responses are analyzed using principal-components
factor analysis of the response correlation matrix
(Reyment and Joreskog, 1996), attempting to isolate
latent factors which account for response hetero-
geneity (Bollen, 1989).
Burrillville Factor Results
Seven factors are retained based on a minimum
eigenvalue of 1.0, accounting for 63.4% of the
variation in Likert-scale responses. These factors
are rotated using the VARIMAX method (Reyment
and Joreskog, 1996). The rotated factor pattern for
Burrillville is shown in table 4. Based on factor
loadings, the seven factors are denoted as follows:
1 = Pro-Zoning, 2 = Pro-Develop, 3 = Con- [impact]
Fee, 4 = Pro-Purchase, 5 = Pro-Tax, 6 = Locate
Commercial, and 7 = Pro-Commercial.
Factor 1 (Pro-Zoning) is characterized by high
factor loading (i.e., a loading greater than 0.5 in
absolute magnitude) on policy options 15, 16, 17,
20, and 21—indicating strong support for policy
options related to stricter zoning or restrictions on
new development. Factor 2 (Pro-Develop) is char-
acterized by high factor loadings for options 2, 4,
12, and 13—indicating support for policy options
that encourage new residential or commercial devel-
opment. Factor 3 (Con-Fee) incorporates high
negative loadings for options associated with the
use of impact fees (options 10 and 11). Factor 4
(Pro-Purchase) is characterized by high loadings
on options 3, 7, and 8—representing different fee-
simple methods of purchasing and preserving
undeveloped land. Factor 5 (Pro-Tax) loads highly
on options 5 and 9—both options involving an
explicit increase in taxes to obtain conservation
objectives. Finally, factors 6 and 7 are associated
with support for commercial development policies.
Exeter Factor Results
Seven factors are retained based on a minimum
eigenvalue of 1.0, accounting for 64.5% of the
variation in Likert-scale responses. These factors
are rotated using the VARIMAX method. The ro-
tated factor pattern for Exeter is reported in table 5.
Based on factor loadings, the seven factors are
denoted as follows: 1 = Pro-Zoning, 2 = Restrict-
Develop, 3 = Pro-Develop, 4 = Con-Purchase, 5 =
Con-Fee, 6 = Pro-Tax, and 7 = Commercial Center.
While not identical, factor scores for the Exeter
sample in many cases reveal patterns similar to
those found in the Burrillville model. Factor 1 (Pro-
Zoning) is characterized by high (>0.5) loadings on
policy options 16, 17, and 21, with a loading of
0.45 on option 19; this factor is similar to factor 1
in the Burrillville model. Factor 2 (Restrict-Develop)
loads highly on options 14, 15, and 18—indicating
support for tools which restrict residential devel-
opment attributes, but do not explicitly reduce acres
or density. Factor 3 (Pro-Develop) is characterized
by high loadings on policy options 1, 2, 4, 12, and
13—tools providing incentives for development or
relaxed restrictions on developers. This factor is
analogous to factor 2 in the Burrillville model.
Factor 4 (Con-Purchase) is characterized by high
negative loadings on options 7 and 8, and is the near Table 4.  Rotated VARIMAX Factor Loadings: Strength of Support for Policy Options, Burrillville, RI






















1 Commercial tax incentives !0.26340 0.22814 0.00610 !0.06867 !0.07978 0.07004 0.73347
2 Residential tax incentives 0.00416 0.75585 0.11073 !0.02229 0.00249 0.04416 0.02388
3 Reduce undeveloped land tax 0.07067 !0.12315 !0.08567 0.62285 !0.13503 !0.04884 !0.22588
4 Expand water and sewer 0.01641 0.63368 0.21774 !0.03302 !0.07953 0.00253 0.29827
5 Increase tax rate 0.11791 !0.16002 0.03549 0.07820 0.66605 0.02767 !0.12051
6 Revitalize town centers 0.24571 0.05107 0.20863 0.48418 !0.16735 0.02815 0.47503
7 Purchase and preserve w/private funds 0.07854 !0.28818 !0.30906 0.62868 !0.01338 0.04956 !0.00280
8 Purchase and preserve w/public funds 0.13052 !0.06863 !0.06289 0.77369 0.24399 0.07103 0.00184
9 Purchase and preserve w/tax funds 0.21075 0.10222 !0.18525 0.41065 0.56260 0.10172 !0.11085
10 Impact fees for public services 0.08597 !0.09084 ! ! ! !0.88037 0.02616 !0.00762 !0.02894 !0.02475
11 Impact fees for environmental damages 0.23472 !0.12084 ! ! ! !0.82635 0.12042 0.06586 0.03234 0.01381
12 Relax residential zoning !0.17714 0.75434 0.13312 !0.17671 !0.00872 0.03060 0.09478
13 Relax commercial zoning !0.27533 0.51506 !0.08866 !0.22662 0.01525 0.00497 0.48879
14 Require developers to preserve land 0.33180 !0.12274 !0.47205 0.18617 !0.41888 0.24529 !0.06088
15 Require trees and shrubs 0.68090 0.04176 !0.09842 0.09806 !0.15135 !0.03259 0.07193
16 Zoning for water protection 0.78354 !0.06898 !0.16708 0.07676 0.01668 0.02535 !0.20924
17 Zoning for wildlife protection 0.79233 !0.01699 !0.14077 0.20304 0.07913 0.00364 !0.22218
18 Require commercial development on roads 0.04161 !0.18711 !0.15093 0.03275 !0.26901 0.63081 0.29361
19 Require commercial development in town !0.01641 0.12491 0.04068 0.04196 0.11691 0.85311 !0.04644
20 Development cap 0.56570 !0.34274 !0.20391 !0.00910 0.25867 !0.06261 0.26897
21 Tighten zoning enforcement 0.58661 !0.34444 !0.15907 !0.02728 0.30294 0.06220 0.13636
 Note: Values appearing in bold italics denote loadings >0.5. Table 5.  Rotated VARIMAX Factor Loadings: Strength of Support for Policy Options, Exeter, RI






















1 Commercial tax incentives !0.30503 0.19232 0.67126 0.20581 0.01898 0.08940 !0.02226
2 Residential tax incentives 0.10710 !0.41094 0.62820 0.07559 0.16889 !0.17565 0.00715
3 Reduce undeveloped land tax 0.15736 0.18420 !0.10717 !0.42748 !0.08749 0.14792 0.45592
4 Expand water and sewer !0.07378 !0.19679 0.65176 0.00771 0.15226 !0.20069 !0.01770
5 Increase tax rate 0.09829 !0.11473 !0.01790 !0.09521 0.08516 0.80518 0.06820
6 Revitalize town centers 0.01154 !0.06202 0.43302 !0.49285 !0.04536 !0.01641 !0.30135
7 Purchase and preserve w/private funds 0.14696 0.24484 !0.28622 ! ! ! !0.64612 !0.09335 !0.10966 !0.01437
8 Purchase and preserve w/public funds 0.17296 !0.00664 !0.17489 ! ! ! !0.75714 !0.11638 0.18775 !0.01351
9 Purchase and preserve w/tax funds 0.20877 !0.10992 !0.10268 !0.49531 !0.25985 0.43641 !0.09560
10 Impact fees for public services 0.05886 0.08247 !0.08934 !0.10273 ! ! ! !0.90638 0.00271 !0.00061
11 Impact fees for environmental damages 0.25540 0.05003 !0.10477 !0.05097 ! ! ! !0.87954 !0.01876 0.00098
12 Relax residential zoning !0.18965 !0.20814 0.63264 0.09566 0.27619 !0.12891 0.06180
13 Relax commercial zoning !0.35229 0.17448 0.70645 0.23240 0.06425 0.11908 0.00430
14 Require developers to preserve land 0.15254 0.60511 !0.18953 !0.30537 !0.07814 !0.17416 0.01682
15 Require trees and shrubs 0.45056 0.54075 !0.05144 !0.03745 !0.14110 !0.14022 0.06077
16 Zoning for water protection 0.86128 0.02835 !0.11717 !0.08808 !0.14221 0.05986 !0.02692
17 Zoning for wildlife protection 0.86260 0.00979 !0.10957 !0.12319 !0.17161 0.08126 !0.00774
18 Require commercial development on roads !0.06999 0.58768 0.14089 0.12910 !0.16016 !0.07116 !0.41033
19 Require commercial development in town 0.04542 0.07335 !0.04331 !0.09416 0.00487 !0.01564 ! ! ! !0.83494
20 Development cap 0.39394 0.32582 !0.26192 !0.00684 !0.21848 0.43169 !0.00489
21 Tighten zoning enforcement 0.56813 0.32051 !0.30869 !0.17694 !0.09004 0.16529 0.08047
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converse of factor 4 (Pro-Purchase) in Burrillville.
Factor 5 (Con-Fee), with high negative loadings on
options 10 and 11, is analogous to the Burrillville
model’s factor 3. Factor 6 (Pro-Tax) is associated
with a loading greater than 0.5 on option 5, with a
loading of 0.44 on option 9—this parallels factor 5
in the Burrillville model. Finally, factor 7
(Commercial Center) is associated with a high
negative loading on option 19, which would require
new commercial development to occur within town
or village centers.
Combined Preference Model Results
The combined choice model incorporates inter-
actions among factor scores associated with policy
tools which influence residential development.
These include factors 1S5 in Burrillville (table 4),
and factors 1S6 in Exeter. Factors related primarily
to commercial development are omitted from the
discrete choice model, as the choice model address-
es only residential development alternatives. Despite
similar interpretations, quantitative differences
between factor scores in Burrillville and Exeter
preclude estimation of a single, pooled model for
both communities. Hence, independent statistical
analyses are conducted.
Estimated factors are included in the random-
effects logit models as standardized factor scores,
with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
This simplifies interpretation of estimated logit
parameters, as the scores indicate the extent to
which a factor score for a particular respondent
differs from that of the sample mean (Reyment and
Joreskog, 1996; Kline and Wichelns, 1998).
Because each respondent’s factor scores are rela-
tive to the sample mean, the analysis corrects for
any potential samplewide patterns of “yea-saying”
(Blamey, Bennett, and Morrison, 1999; Boyle et al.,
1998) or similar behavior which might tend to arti-
ficially inflate (or diminish) stated support for certain
management tools. Factor scores are included both as
linear terms and as quadratic interactions with other
variables. This enables assessment of whether sup-
port for various management tools—as characterized
by factor scores derived from principal-component
factor analysis—is correlated with preferences for
development or conservation outcomes.
5
Model results are presented in table 6.
6 Both the
Burrillville and Exeter models are significant at
p<0.0001 (!2LnLχ
2=575.50, df=101; !2LnL χ
2 =
670.18, df=118, respectively). A log-likelihood ratio
test of the unrestricted models versus restricted
models in which all effects related to Likert-scale
factors are constrained to zero rejects the null





Because policy support was measured in a dis-
tinct section of the survey from contingent choice
questions, statistical significance of these inter-
actions may not be attributed to simple correlations
among policy options and land use outcomes which
might have otherwise been present in choice sce-
narios. Accordingly, the reported findings for the
combined model are solely the result of preference
heterogeneity related to support for particular types
of land use policy.
The joint significance of factor score interactions
does not indicate whether these interactions repre-
sent intuitive correlations between land use pref-
erences and policy support. Hence, to assess the
potential intuition underlying model results, we
consider individual interactions associated with
selected factor scores. Although statistically signifi-
cant interactions are associated with all factor scores,
we target discussion around factors with a relatively
large or highly significant set of interactions.
Pro-Zoning Factor Score Interactions 
(Factor 1, Burrillville and Exeter)
A greater factor score for factor 1 implies stronger
general support for zoning tools. Among statistically
significant interactions for Burrillville respondents,
those with greater-than-average scores for the Pro-
5  Preliminary models were estimated to assess whether the choice
models should be amended to incorporate additional interactions with
demographic attributes such as age, education, and income. Likelihood-
ratio tests assessing the joint significance of appended interactions fail to
reject the null hypothesis of zero joint influence at p < 0.10 for combined
quadratic interactions including a respondent’s age, length of residency,
a dummy variable indicating respondents with at least a four-year college
education, and a dummy variable identifying respondents with income
below $40,000 (Burrillville !2LnL χ
2 = 76.77, df = 68; Exeter !2LnL χ
2
= 81.60, df = 68). Based on these results, we proceed with a final model
that includes interactions with factor scores as detailed above, but excludes
interactions with demographic attributes.
6  We also attempted to estimate this model using a random parameters
structure (McFadden and Train, 2000). Despite adapting Train’s condi-
tional logit code for binary logit and using Halton sequence-based numer-
ical integration (Train, 2002), neither models with all parameters random
nor models with only the parameter on the payment vehicle Tax$Dif
random (e.g., Layton, 2000) converged in several days of dedicated
computer time. Based on the similarity of estimates between a random-
effects 20-parameter primary-effects model and the same model with all
parameters random (one of the largest random parameter models of which
we are aware), we believe the random-effects model adequately addresses
the panel structure of these data. Since the data are binary, the IIA impli-
cation relaxed by random parameters models is not an issue.76   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Zoning factor have a stronger aversion to housing
density, as indicated by the negative and statistically
significant parameter estimate associated with Pro-
Zoning×Dense$Dif. Given common perceptions of
zoning as a tool associated with constraints on
housing density, the significance of this interaction
is not unexpected. Tax changes (Tax$Dif) are also
relatively less important for respondents with higher
Pro-Zoning scores, an effect with less obvious eco-
nomic intuition.
Among Exeter respondents, those with greater-
than-average scores for the analogous Pro-Zoning
factor reveal a significantly higher marginal utility
of open space preservation (Adj$Open, Iso$Open)
and of developments less visible from main roads
(Low$Vis). Higher Pro-Zoning factor scores are
also correlated with lower marginal utility associated
with the division of developments into multiple,
smaller clusters (Develop4). Hence, while results
suggest correlation among support for zoning tools
and land use attributes that might be influenced by
zoning (e.g., housing density, low-visibility develop-
ment) among both Burrillville and Exeter respond-
ents, results differ across the two communities.
Pro-Develop Factor Score Interactions 
(Burrillville Factor 2, Exeter Factor 3)
Among Burrillville respondents, interactions involv-
ing factor 2 (Pro-Develop) indicate correlation
among support for pro-development policies and a
reduction in negative marginal utility associated
with increases in housing density (Dense$Dif), the
size of residential developments (Size$Dif), and the
presence of developments adjacent to main roads
(Develop$Road). Indeed, for those with particularly
high scores for Pro-Develop, marginal utility associ-
ated with these land use attributes may be positive,
while the average respondent maintains negative
marginal utility for these attributes. This finding
reveals a correlation between support for pro-
development policies and positive preferences for
attributes of residential development. However,
among Burrillville respondents, support for such
policies is not correlated with utility for conserva-
tion attributes such as preserved open space. Thus,
results indicate that respondents in Burrillville who
support pro-development policies maintain similar
marginal valuations of conservation attributes other
than those directly associated with residential devel-
opment.
Exeter results reveal significant and intuitive
correlations between support for pro-development
policies and a reduction in negative marginal utility
associated with housing density (Dense$Dif), and
a decrease in the marginal utility of habitat improve-
ments for large mammals (Lg$Mammal) and un-
common birds (Uncom$Bird).
However, other statistically significant correla-
tions have less obvious intuition. For example, the
positive sign of Pro-Develop×Low$Vis indicates
higher Pro-Develop factor scores are correlated with
a stronger preference for reductions in development
visibility. Similarly, higher Pro-Develop factor
scores are correlated with an increased marginal
utility of certain types of open space preservation
(Pro-Develop×Iso$Open>0).
Hence, in both towns, respondents with stronger
support for pro-development policies still favor
attributes associated with open space conservation.
Indeed, these respondents may, in some cases,
exhibit stronger relative preferences for conser-
vation.
Con-Fee Factor Score Interactions 
(Burrillville Factor 3, Exeter Factor 5)
Within the Burrillville sample, opposition to impact
fees is correlated with lower marginal utility of
open space adjacent to roads and developments,
and higher marginal utility for the preservation of
common bird habitat. Although statistically signif-
icant, these correlations defy simple explanation.
Both open space and wildlife habitat are resources
with a typically positive marginal utility which may
be preserved as a result of funds raised through
impact fees. However, the signs of the associated
interactions (Con-Fee×Adj$Open and Con-Fee×
Com$Bird) do not coincide.
Among Exeter respondents, results are more
intuitive. For example, among other significant
interactions, higher Con-Fee factor scores are
correlated with a reduction in the negative marginal
utility of housing density, Con-Fee×Dense$Dif 
(i.e., a more positive reaction to housing density) at
p<0.01.
Con- or Pro-Purchase Factor Score Interactions
(Factor 4 in Burrillville and Exeter)
Among Burrillville respondents, factor 4 character-
izes the extent to which respondents favor tools
resulting in the purchase and preservation of open
space. Among Exeter respondents, factor 4 charac-
terizes the extent to which respondents oppose such
tools.Johnston et al. Residential Development Preferences and Policy Support   77
Table 6.  Combined Factor Analysis/Choice Model Results
BURRILLVILLE RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL EXETER RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL
Description
Parameter   
Estimate   
  z-
 Statistic Description
Parameter   
Estimate   
  z-
 Statistic
Linear Attributes: Linear Attributes:
  Intercept 0.07758 1.00   Intercept !0.22687*** !2.77
  Edge$Area 0.19372*** 6.00   Edge$Area 0.15199*** 4.29
  Develop2   !0.32325 !1.51   Develop2 !0.51347** !2.22
  Develop4 !0.62014*** !3.86   Develop4 !0.50080*** !2.98
  Iso$Open 0.00869*** 5.24   Iso$Open 0.00720*** 3.92
  Adj$Open 0.00473*** 5.47   Adj$Open 0.00479*** 5.23
  Develop$Road !0.32627*** !2.60   Develop$Road !0.36659*** !2.72
  Lg$Mammal 0.20133*** 3.12   Lg$Mammal 0.17991*** 2.76
  Sm$Mammal !0.07232 !1.15   Sm$Mammal !0.08848 !1.39
  Com$Bird 0.12395*** 2.83   Com$Bird 0.09654** 2.02
  Uncom$Bird !0.06152 !1.39   Uncom$Bird 0.02437 0.56
  Wet$Sp 0.02315 0.51   Wet$Sp 0.08757* 1.80
  Dense$Dif !1.10914*** !10.34   Dense$Dif !1.05341*** !9.75
  Size$Dif !0.00706*** !6.36   Size$Dif !0.00866*** !7.18
  Traf$Light 0.24119** 2.17   Traf$Light 0.14324 1.26
  Low$Vis 0.16377 1.51   Low$Vis 0.24504** 2.17
  Tax$Dif !0.00525*** !9.09   Tax$Dif !0.00631*** !9.86
Factor 1 Interactions: Factor 1 Interactions:
  Pro-Zoning×Edge$Area 0.03617 1.11   Pro-Zoning×Edge$Area 0.02745 0.82
  Pro-Zoning×Develop2 !0.34357 !1.48   Pro-Zoning×Develop2 !0.09642 !0.39
  Pro-Zoning×Develop4 0.07518 0.44   Pro-Zoning×Develop4 !0.37666** !2.12
  Pro-Zoning×Iso$Open 0.00113 0.71   Pro-Zoning×Iso$Open 0.00511** 2.44
  Pro-Zoning×Adj$Open !0.00003 !0.04   Pro-Zoning×Adj$Open 0.00186* 1.92
  Pro-Zoning×Develop$Road !0.00938 !0.07   Pro-Zoning×Develop$Road 0.03739 0.27
  Pro-Zoning×Lg$Mammal 0.00759 0.12   Pro-Zoning×Lg$Mammal 0.06156 0.90
  Pro-Zoning×Sm$Mammal 0.01526 0.24   Pro-Zoning×Sm$Mammal 0.05665 0.87
  Pro-Zoning×Com$Bird !0.01672 !0.36   Pro-Zoning×Com$Bird !0.05187 !1.04
  Pro-Zoning×Uncom$Bird !0.09371** !2.03   Pro-Zoning×Uncom$Bird 0.00150 0.03
  Pro-Zoning×Wet$Sp 0.03232 0.68   Pro-Zoning×Wet$Sp 0.02661 0.50
  Pro-Zoning×Dense$Dif !0.22294** !2.14   Pro-Zoning×Dense$Dif !0.08365 !0.87
  Pro-Zoning×Size$Dif !0.00145 !1.29   Pro-Zoning×Size$Dif !0.00047 !0.38
  Pro-Zoning×Traf$Light 0.07196 0.66   Pro-Zoning×Traf$Light !0.01987 !0.17
  Pro-Zoning×Low$Vis 0.16377 1.38   Pro-Zoning×Low$Vis 0.19556* 1.66
  Pro-Zoning×Tax$Dif 0.00194*** 3.44   Pro-Zoning×Tax$Dif !0.00004 !0.07
Factor 2 Interactions: Factor 2 Interactions:
  Pro-Develop×Edge$Area !0.00051 !0.02   Restrict-Develop×Edge$Area 0.04612 1.34
  Pro-Develop×Develop2 !0.04866 !0.21   Restrict-Develop×Develop2 !0.04645 !0.21
  Pro-Develop×Develop4 0.25963 1.55   Restrict-Develop×Develop4 !0.21466 !1.18
  Pro-Develop×Iso$Open !0.00118 !0.70   Restrict-Develop×Iso$Open 0.00100 0.53
  Pro-Develop×Adj$Open !0.00000 !0.00   Restrict-Develop×Adj$Open !0.00039 !0.40
  Pro-Develop×Develop$Road 0.21904* 1.81   Restrict-Develop×Develop$Road 0.00713        0.05
  Pro-Develop×Lg$Mammal 0.03904 0.59   Restrict-Develop×Lg$Mammal 0.02898 0.43
  Pro-Develop×Sm$Mammal 0.04285 0.68   Restrict-Develop×Sm$Mammal 0.03271        0.49
  Pro-Develop×Com$Bird !0.03845 !0.89   Restrict-Develop×Com$Bird 0.01197 0.25
  Pro-Develop×Uncom$Bird 0.00071 0.02   Restrict-Develop×Uncom$Bird !0.02369 !0.49
  Pro-Develop×Wet$Sp !0.05858 !1.24   Restrict-Develop×Wet$Sp !0.02347 !0.47
  Pro-Develop×Dense$Dif 0.25970*** 2.68   Restrict-Develop×Dense$Dif !0.02512 !0.26
  Pro-Develop×Size$Dif 0.00223** 2.08   Restrict-Develop×Size$Dif 0.00240** 1.98
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Table 6.  Continued
BURRILLVILLE RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL EXETER RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL
Description
Parameter    
Estimate    
  z-
 Statistic Description
Parameter    
Estimate    
  z-
 Statistic
Factor 2 Interactions (cont’d.): Factor 2 Interactions (cont’d.):
  Pro-Develop×Traf$Light 0.17265 1.57   Restrict-Develop×Traf$Light 0.01346 0.11
  Pro-Develop×Low$Vis 0.09646 0.88   Restrict-Develop×Low$Vis 0.10386 0.88
  Pro-Develop×Tax$Dif !0.00056 !1.09   Restrict-Develop×Tax$Dif 0.00133** 2.24
Factor 3 Interactions: Factor 3 Interactions:
  Con-Fee×Edge$Area !0.00821 !0.27   Pro-Develop×Edge$Area !0.04005 !1.18
  Con-Fee×Develop2 !0.11404 !0.52   Pro-Develop×Develop2 !0.01097 !0.05
  Con-Fee×Develop4 0.09276 0.58   Pro-Develop×Develop4 0.15616 0.90
  Con-Fee×Iso$Open !0.00200 !1.18   Pro-Develop×Iso$Open 0.00342* 1.83
  Con-Fee×Adj$Open !0.00155* !1.74   Pro-Develop×Adj$Open !0.00055 !0.60
  Con-Fee×Develop$Road !0.11520 !0.93   Pro-Develop×Develop$Road 0.08319 0.62
  Con-Fee×Lg$Mammal 0.03776 0.58   Pro-Develop×Lg$Mammal !0.12396* !1.82
  Con-Fee×Sm$Mammal !0.09316 !1.49   Pro-Develop×Sm$Mammal !0.06639 !1.05
  Con-Fee×Com$Bird 0.10055** 2.24   Pro-Develop×Com$Bird 0.01158 0.23
  Con-Fee×Uncom$Bird !0.05620 !1.31   Pro-Develop×Uncom$Bird !0.09249** !1.97
  Con-Fee×Wet$Sp !0.03083 !0.67   Pro-Develop×Wet$Sp 0.04576 0.89
  Con-Fee×Dense$Dif 0.09999 1.14   Pro-Develop×Dense$Dif 0.32707*** 3.29
  Con-Fee×Size$Dif 0.00094 0.81   Pro-Develop×Size$Dif 0.00062 0.51
  Con-Fee×Traf$Light !0.16560 !1.48   Pro-Develop×Traf$Light 0.10391 0.91
  Con-Fee×Low$Vis 0.12544 1.13   Pro-Develop×Low$Vis 0.21997* 1.84
  Con-Fee×Tax$Dif !0.00033 !0.63   Pro-Develop×Tax$Dif !0.00011 !0.19
Factor 4 Interactions: Factor 4 Interactions:
  Pro-Purchase×Edge$Area 0.03820 1.21   Con-Purchase×Edge$Area !0.01431 !0.41
  Pro-Purchase×Develop2 !0.40161* !1.83   Con-Purchase×Develop2 0.00413 0.02
  Pro-Purchase×Develop4 0.00492 0.03   Con-Purchase×Develop4 !0.10306 !0.58
  Pro-Purchase×Iso$Open 0.00200 1.22   Con-Purchase×Iso$Open !0.00213 !1.01
  Pro-Purchase×Adj$Open 0.00134 1.57   Con-Purchase×Adj$Open !0.00147 !1.52
  Pro-Purchase×Develop$Road !0.00009 !0.00   Con-Purchase×Develop$Road !0.14861 !1.07
  Pro-Purchase×Lg$Mammal !0.08574 !1.35   Con-Purchase×Lg$Mammal !0.06191 !0.92
  Pro-Purchase×Sm$Mammal 0.11317* 1.75   Con-Purchase×Sm$Mammal 0.00138 0.02
  Pro-Purchase×Com$Bird !0.02193 !0.50   Con-Purchase×Com$Bird 0.06176 1.19
  Pro-Purchase×Uncom$Bird 0.00068 0.01   Con-Purchase×Uncom$Bird !0.03672 !0.81
  Pro-Purchase×Wet$Sp 0.00214 0.05   Con-Purchase×Wet$Sp 0.03901 0.76
  Pro-Purchase×Dense$Dif !0.13803 !1.39   Con-Purchase×Dense$Dif !0.05802 !0.56
  Pro-Purchase×Size$Dif !0.00063 !0.57   Con-Purchase×Size$Dif 0.00137 1.09
  Pro-Purchase×Traf$Light 0.12755 1.14   Con-Purchase×Traf$Light 0.01084 0.09
  Pro-Purchase×Low$Vis 0.01603 0.14   Con-Purchase×Low$Vis !0.00098 !0.01
  Pro-Purchase×Tax$Dif 0.00057 1.08   Con-Purchase×Tax$Dif !0.00301*** !4.72
Factor 5 Interactions: Factor 5 Interactions:
  Pro-Tax×Edge$Area 0.05578* 1.65   Con-Fee×Edge$Area !0.05868* !1.66
  Pro-Tax×Develop2 !0.16358 !0.68   Con-Fee×Develop2 0.11907 0.48
  Pro-Tax×Develop4 !0.37328** !2.14   Con-Fee×Develop4 0.11236 0.66
  Pro-Tax×Iso$Open 0.00380** 2.30   Con-Fee×Iso$Open 0.00013 0.06
  Pro-Tax×Adj$Open 0.00122 1.41   Con-Fee×Adj$Open 0.00007 0.07
  Pro-Tax×Develop$Road !0.15582 !1.17   Con-Fee×Develop$Road !0.00848 !0.06
  Pro-Tax×Lg$Mammal 0.00587 0.09   Con-Fee×Lg$Mammal !0.10928 !1.59
  Pro-Tax×Sm$Mammal !0.04116 !0.65   Con-Fee×Sm$Mammal 0.06736 1.03
  Pro-Tax×Com$Bird !0.00322 !0.07   Con-Fee×Com$Bird !0.01664 !0.34
  Pro-Tax×Uncom$Bird !0.00981 !0.21   Con-Fee×Uncom$Bird 0.03435 0.76
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Table 6.  Continued
BURRILLVILLE RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL EXETER RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT MODEL
Description
Parameter    
Estimate    
  z-
 Statistic Description
Parameter    
Estimate    
  z-
 Statistic
Factor 5 Interactions (cont’d.): Factor 5 Interactions (cont’d.):
  Pro-Tax×Wet$Sp 0.08994* 1.85   Con-Fee×Wet$Sp !0.09721* !1.91
  Pro-Tax×Dense$Dif !0.02141 !0.22   Con-Fee×Dense$Dif 0.25776*** 2.87
  Pro-Tax×Size$Dif 0.00144 1.27   Con-Fee×Size$Dif 0.00145 1.21
  Pro-Tax×Traf$Light !0.03947 !0.36   Con-Fee×Traf$Light !0.09829 !0.84
  Pro-Tax×Low$Vis !0.02486 !0.22   Con-Fee×Low$Vis 0.01059 0.09
  Pro-Tax×Tax$Dif 0.00124** 2.28   Con-Fee×Tax$Dif 0.00067 1.29
Factor 6 Interactions:
  Pro-Tax×Edge$Area !0.02745 !0.81
  Pro-Tax×Develop2 0.13583 0.56
  Pro-Tax×Develop4 !0.07082 !0.42
  Pro-Tax×Iso$Open 0.00043 0.23
  Pro-Tax×Adj$Open 0.00185* 1.93
  Pro-Tax×Develop$Road 0.08520 0.61
  Pro-Tax×Lg$Mammal 0.00645 0.10
  Pro-Tax×Sm$Mammal 0.00846 0.12
  Pro-Tax×Com$Bird !0.02302 !0.47
  Pro-Tax×Uncom$Bird !0.04701 !0.97
  Pro-Tax×Wet$Sp 0.01100 0.21
  Pro-Tax×Dense$Dif !0.07494 !0.80
  Pro-Tax×Size$Dif !0.00319*** !2.63
  Pro-Tax×Traf$Light 0.08810 0.70
  Pro-Tax×Low$Vis 0.03707 0.31
  Pro-Tax×Tax$Dif 0.00347*** 5.24
Factor Main Effects: Factor Main Effects:
  Pro-Zoning !0.05777 !0.73   Pro-Zoning 0.12860 1.50
  Pro-Develop !0.01081 !0.14   Restrict-Develop 0.09911 1.12
  Con-Fee 0.11629 1.46   Pro-Develop !0.06941 !0.83
  Pro-Purchase !0.07608 !0.96   Con-Purchase !0.08285 !0.95
  Pro-Tax !0.04493 !0.55   Con-Fee 0.16370** 2.02
  Pro-Tax 0.03015 0.35
  ln(σv) !1.51 1.02   ln(σv) !1.78 1.48
  σv 0.47 0.24   σv 0.41 0.30
  ρ 0.18 0.15   ρ 0.05 0.02
  χ
2 for LR test (ρ = 0): 1.18 (Prob = 0.14)           χ
2 for LR test (ρ = 0): 0.53 (Prob = 0.23)         
!2LnL χ
2: 575.50 (Prob = 0.01)         !2LnL χ
2: 670.18 (Prob = 0.01)         
 Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively.
Although the interactions of Pro-Purchase×
Iso$Open and Pro-Purchase×Adj$Open in Burrill-
ville indicate a point-estimate gain in marginal
utility associated with strength of support for the
purchase and preservation of undeveloped land, this
effect is not statistically significant at p<0.10 (for
Pro-Purchase×Adj$Open, p<0.12). That is, from
a statistical perspective, support for the purchase
and preservation of open space is not correlated
with the marginal utility of preserved open space.
An analogous lack of statistical significance is found
in the Exeter sample. However, among Exeter
responses, we find significant and intuitive correla-
tion between opposition to purchase and preservation
of open space and an increased marginal utility of
income (i.e., tax changes).
Pro-Tax Factor Score Interactions 
(Burrillville Factor 5, Exeter Factor 6)
This factor characterizes a respondent’s willing-
ness to support policies which include explicit tax80   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
increases. Among other statistically significant
correlations, the significant parameter estimate
associated with Pro-Tax×Iso$Open in Burrillville
and Pro-Tax×Adj$Open in Exeter indicates the
welfare gain associated with open space preserva-
tion is greater for those with higher Pro-Tax factor
scores. Also among both samples, positive and
significant parameter estimates associated with Pro-
Tax×Tax$Dif support the intuitive result that higher
Pro-Tax factor scores are associated with a lower
marginal utility of income (or tax changes).
Implications and Discussion
Although the combined factor analysis-logit model
suggests numerous intuitive correlations among sup-
port for land use management tools and marginal
utility of attributes associated with those tools,
model results also highlight the potential risk in
presuming such correlations exist on a wide scale,
or that all correlations will match simple intuition.
While statistically significant correlations exist,
results do not indicate a particularly pervasive set of
associations between policy support and outcome
preferences. Moreover, while we find no cases in
which model results establish outright conflict be-
tween policy support and land use preferences, some
statistically significant correlations defy simple,
intuitive explanation.
Among the more statistically significant corre-
lations are those involving the marginal utility
of housing density and tax changes. For example,
both Burrillville and Exeter responses show a
statistically significant interaction between the pro-
development factor and the marginal utility of
housing density; this correlation is significant at
p<0.01 in both models. Similarly, Tax$Dif (the
change in household taxes) has statistically sig-
nificant interactions with at least two factor scores
in each model. However, marginal utility for most
model attributes is correlated (at p<0.10) with at
least one factor score, in at least one of the two
estimated models.
While the preceding discussion has, for the most
part, emphasized the presence of statistically signif-
icant interactions, a lack of statistical significance
may also be of potential importance. For example,
the model demonstrates no statistically significant
relationship between strength of support for the
purchase and preservation of undeveloped land and
the marginal utility of preserved open space. Indeed,
statistically significant interactions appear to be the
exception rather than the rule.
Of 80 total interactions included in the combined
model for Burrillville, only 15 are statistically sig-
nificant at p<0.10. In the Exeter model, 18 out of
96 interactions are statistically significant. These
results suggest substantial independence among
indicators of policy support and the marginal utility
of associated land use attributes. While reasons for
this outcome are unknown, it may be related in part
to poorly defined associations among certain man-
agement tools and management outcomes among
typical respondents (recall, support for tools and
preferences for outcomes were measured in distinct
sections of the survey instrument).
These results suggest that (a) the marginal utility
for management outcomes is in many cases inde-
pendent of support for tools which might be used to
achieve those outcomes; (b) significant correlation
among support for management tools and marginal
utility of management outcomes may be more prev-
alent for particular types of outcomes (e.g., housing
density, tax changes); and (c) the relationships
among support for policies and preferences for
outcomes are in some cases less intuitive than is
typically assumed.
These conclusions have potential implications
for the policy process in rural communities, particu-
larly in cases where residents’ support is required to
enact policy changes. For example, one might spec-
ulate that if welfare gain resulting from open space
preservation or similar policies is not correlated
with support for tools designed to accomplish these
goals (perhaps because residents have imperfect or
inaccurate perceptions of management tools), then
policy makers may face difficulty in obtaining a
broad base of unequivocal resident support. How-
ever, in areas where policy support and welfare
effects coincide, constituency-building may be more
effective.
Model results also indicate correlations between
policy support and the marginal utility of land use
attributes may differ across communities. While in
some cases the Exeter and Burrillville models pro-
duce similar results, there are also numerous differ-
ences in correlations found in the two models. These
findings are not unexpected given differences in the
communities sampled.
Despite similar demographic profiles, Burrillville
is more densely populated (2000 population of
15,796, and a density of 284.1 persons/square mile)
with more significant areas that might be charac-
terized as suburban (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
2000; Rhode Island Department of Administration,
2001). Exeter is almost entirely rural, with a moreJohnston et al. Residential Development Preferences and Policy Support   81
sparse population (2000 population of 6,045, and a
density of 104.7 persons/square mile) (U.S. Bureau
of the Census, 2000). The communities also differ
in terms of zoning and land development regulations
as well as in the percentage of land preserved as
open space by government or nongovernmental
entities (Rhode Island Department of Administra-
tion, 2001). Such divergences in population density,
land cover, and land use regulation could easily con-
tribute to the statistical differences found here.
Conclusion
While the literature provides significant insight into
the preferences of rural residents for outcomes
of land management, preferences for outcomes do
not necessarily imply matching support for the
underlying policy process. Nonetheless, economists
typically disassociate preferences for management
outcomes from detailed analysis of policies that
might generate those outcomes. Such piecemeal
analysis may result in misleading or, at best, partial
guidance to policy makers. The preceding analysis
shows that preferences for management outcomes
are sometimes, but not necessarily, correlated with
support for associated policy tools. While numerous
intuitive and statistically significant correlations
exist, statistical significance does not guarantee an
intuitive or easily interpretable relationship.
These findings highlight the potential limitations
of preference elicitation methods used in isolation.
While typical conjoint or choice models may reveal
the marginal utility of management outcomes, they
often fail to assess whether estimated preferences
are linked with a corresponding support for man-
agement options able to deliver valued outcomes.
Similarly, surveys that assess strength of support
for management tools rarely assess the welfare
implications of land use outcomes which would
result from application of those tools. By over-
looking the possibility of significant positive or
negative correlations, researchers risk unanticipated
public reactions to the policy process. This study
highlights such potential complexities, in the hope
of stimulating further research to aid in rural policy
development.
To our knowledge, this study presents the first
broad analysis of correlation among preferences for
rural land use attributes and support for associated
policy mechanisms. However, given the character-
istics of available survey data, the analysis cannot
explicitly address the impact of different policy tools
on the welfare implications of land use policies.
One possible direction for future analysis would be
to incorporate detailed and varying descriptions of
policy options into choice questions evaluated by
respondents. Analysts could then assess individuals’
support for different policy mechanisms relative to
the marginal utilities associated with the physical
land use outcomes.
More advanced analysis might also elucidate pro-
posed tradeoffs among the attributes of the policy
tools themselves, such as preferences for long-term
flexibility, equitable treatment of residents or prop-
erty owners, and the distribution of benefits and
costs over heterogeneous stakeholder groups. Such
research could facilitate academics’ ability to extend
the tools of preference assessment for use in design-
ing more successful land use policy programs in the
public interest. The challenge facing researchers is
to develop means to incorporate such elements in
stated preference surveys, while preserving survey
formats that are manageable for typical respondents
and findings that are accessible to the policy
audience.
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